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VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Decades of litigation over the effects of pervasive 
asbestos use have yielded a financial burden borne across an 
array of industries.  Today we must decide which of two 
companies will bear costs associated with a staggering 
number of asbestos claims.  These companies—a historical 
manufacturer of asbestos-containing products and its 
insurer—dispute the rightful allocation of asbestos-related 
losses under thirty-year-old excess insurance policies.  While 
the policies are dated, the consequences of our interpretation 
are immediate both to the parties at hand and to those insurers 
and insureds whose relationships are similarly governed. 
 The chief issue on appeal is whether a policy exclusion 
that disclaims losses “arising out of asbestos” will prevent a 
manufacturer from obtaining indemnification for thousands of 
negotiated settlements with plaintiffs who have suffered 
adverse health effects from exposure to its asbestos-
containing products.  The answer hinges on whether the 
language of the exclusion is ambiguous.  After a bench trial, 
the District Court found that the phrase “arising out of 
asbestos” contained latent ambiguity because the exclusion 
could reasonably be read to exclude only losses related to raw 
asbestos, as opposed to losses related to asbestos-containing 
products.  We disagree.  The phrase “arising out of,” when 
used in a Pennsylvania insurance exclusion, unambiguously 
requires “but for” causation.  Because the losses relating to 
the underlying asbestos suits would not have occurred but for 
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asbestos, raw or within finished products, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court.   
I. 
 Plaintiff-Appellee General Refractories Company 
(“GRC”) is a manufacturer and supplier of refractory 
products that are designed to retain their strength when 
exposed to extreme heat.  To serve this purpose, GRC 
previously included asbestos in some of its products.  GRC’s 
use of asbestos brought about approximately 31,440 lawsuits 
alleging injuries from “exposure to asbestos-containing 
products manufactured, sold, and distributed by GRC” dating 
back to 1978.  (J.A. 199.)   
 GRC’s insurers initially fielded these claims.  During 
the 1970s and ‘80s, GRC had entered into primary liability 
insurance policies with a number of different insurers.  GRC 
also secured additional excess insurance policies to provide 
liability coverage beyond the limits of its primary insurance 
policies, including several excess policies issued by 
Defendant-Appellant Travelers Surety and Casualty 
Company, formerly known as the Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company.  As the number of asbestos-related injury claims 
against GRC began to grow, the primary insurers continued to 
defend and indemnify GRC.  But this arrangement came to a 
halt in 1994 when GRC’s liabilities from thousands of settled 
claims far exceeded the limits of its primary insurance 
coverage.  In 2002, after years of continued settlements, GRC 
tendered the underlying claims to its excess insurance 
carriers, including Travelers, all of whom denied coverage on 
the basis of exclusions for asbestos claims.   
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 GRC commenced this action against its excess insurers 
seeking a declaration of coverage for losses related to the 
underlying asbestos claims, as well as breach of contract 
damages.  Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 94 F. 
Supp. 3d 649, 652 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  GRC eventually 
settled with all of the excess insurance defendants—except 
Travelers—by means of a stipulated dismissal with prejudice.  
Id.  Travelers is the only excess insurer remaining in this 
litigation.   
 Travelers’ contractual relationship with GRC is 
governed by two substantively identical excess insurance 
policies providing coverage from 1985 to 1986.  Each policy 
obliges Travelers to indemnify GRC “against EXCESS NET 
LOSS arising out of an accident or occurrence during the 
policy period” subject to the stated limits of liability and 
additional terms.1  (J.A. 370, 381.)  In maintaining that it need 
not compensate GRC for losses related to the underlying 
asbestos claims, Travelers relies on an “Asbestos Exclusion” 
contained within the excess insurance contracts, which reads: 
                                              
1 Both Travelers policies define “EXCESS NET 
LOSS” as “that part of the total of all sums which the 
INSURED becomes legally obligated to pay or has paid, as 
damages on account of any one accident or occurrence, and 
which would be covered by the terms of the Controlling 
Underlying Insurance, if written without any limit of liability, 
less realized recoveries and salvages, which is in excess of 
any self-insured retention and the total of the applicable limits 
of liability of all policies described in [the] Schedule of 
Underlying Insurance; whether or not such policies are in 
force.”  (J.A. 370, 381.) 
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It is agreed that this policy does not apply to 
EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of asbestos, 
including but not limited to bodily injury arising 
out of asbestosis or related diseases or to 
property damage.   
(J.A. 377, 388.)  The policies do not define the terms “arising 
out of” or “asbestos.”  Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d 
at 654.   
 At its core, the parties dispute the meaning of four 
words within the Asbestos Exclusion:  “arising out of 
asbestos.”  (J.A. 377, 388.)  The District Court held a one-day 
bench trial specifically to interpret this language.  GRC took 
the position that at the time the policies were drafted “arising 
out of asbestos” had a separate meaning than “arising out of 
asbestos-containing products.”  Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. 
Supp. 3d at 653.  In GRC’s view, the term “asbestos” plainly 
referred to the raw asbestos mineral that is “mined, milled, 
processed, produced, or manufactured for sale in its raw 
form.”  Id.  There is no dispute that GRC made and sold 
refractory products that sometimes contained asbestos 
components.  But the parties also agree that GRC “never 
mined, milled, processed, produced, or manufactured raw 
mineral asbestos.”  Id. at 654.  Thus, GRC argued that the 
exclusion did not encompass claims based on exposure to its 
finished asbestos-containing products.   
 To support its narrow interpretation of the Asbestos 
Exclusion, GRC presented several types of extrinsic evidence, 
including:  
 examples of comparable insurance policies 
that other insurers had issued in the late 
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1970s through 1985, which explicitly 
excluded “asbestos” and products containing 
asbestos; 
 
 examples of comparable insurance policies 
that explicitly defined the term “asbestos” 
broadly as “the mineral asbestos in any 
form”; 
 
 six consecutive policies sold by Travelers 
(as Aetna Casualty) to other policyholders 
from 1978 to 1985 which contained a more 
comprehensive and explicit asbestos 
exclusion2 than the one included in the two 
policies sold to GRC; 
 
 the Wellington Agreement,3 which defined 
“Asbestos-Related Claims” as “any claims 
                                              
2 The broader asbestos exclusion read:  “[T]his 
insurance does not apply to bodily injury which arises in 
whole or in part, either directly or indirectly, out of asbestos, 
whether or not the asbestos is airborne as a fiber or particle, 
contained in a product, carried on clothing, or transmitted in 
any fashion whatsoever.”  Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 
3d at 655. 
 
3 In the early 1980s, meetings between the plaintiffs’ 
bar, target defendants in asbestos-related litigation, and six 
major insurance carriers (including Aetna Casualty) were 
moderated by Harry Wellington, Dean of Yale Law School.  
As a result, a settlement process emerged which came to be 
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or lawsuits . . . alleged to have been caused 
in whole or in part by any asbestos or 
asbestos-containing product”; 
 
 the expert testimony of Gene Locks, a 
lawyer who represented over 15,000 
asbestos claimants and was the lead 
negotiator at the Wellington meetings, in 
which Locks explained that the terms 
“asbestos” and “asbestos-containing 
product” had distinct meanings to the parties 
involved in asbestos litigation during the 
relevant timeframe.  
 
Id. at 654–57. 
 On the other hand, Travelers contended that the only 
reasonable interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion is that 
claims for injuries related to asbestos in any form were 
excluded.  Travelers asserted that this is the “natural, plain, 
and ordinary meaning of the terms, ‘arising out of asbestos.’”  
Id. at 652–53.  Thus, Travelers asserted that GRC’s losses 
associated with the underlying asbestos claims were 
precluded by the Asbestos Exclusion.  For support, Travelers 
presented “GRC’s corporate records, as well [as] its 
communications with Travelers and its own insurance 
broker,” as evidence of “the parties’ intent to exclude—or 
their awareness, belief, or knowledge that the purchased 
insurance did exclude—all injuries related to asbestos in any 
form.”  Id. at 656–57. 
                                                                                                     
known as the Wellington Agreement.  Gen. Refractories Co., 
94 F. Supp. 3d at 656.  
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 After weighing the evidence and arguments, the 
District Court issued a memorandum and order concluding 
that the Asbestos Exclusion contained a latent ambiguity 
“because the terms [were] reasonably capable of being 
understood in more than one sense.”  Id. at 660.  The District 
Court agreed that GRC’s interpretation of “asbestos” as 
referring only to the raw mineral asbestos rather than other 
finished products containing asbestos was “consistent with 
the plain meaning of the written policy,” and therefore 
“objectively reasonable,” and that Travelers had not met its 
burden of showing that GRC’s interpretation was 
unreasonable.  Id.   
 Having found ambiguity, the District Court observed 
that GRC’s industry custom and trade usage evidence 
supported the assertion that “[d]uring the relevant era, 
industry participants used the phrase to denote losses arising 
from mining, milling, producing, processing, or 
manufacturing the raw mineral,” not from “finished 
products.”  Id. at 663.  The District Court found no evidence 
in the record contradicting this interpretation, and further 
rejected Travelers’ characterization of its course of 
performance evidence.  Id. at 663–664.  Ultimately, the 
District Court concluded that Travelers had failed to “show 
not only that its interpretation is reasonable, but also that 
GRC’s interpretation is not reasonable.”  Id. at 664.  
Accordingly, the District Court deemed the Asbestos 
Exclusion unenforceable to preclude indemnification to GRC 
for its losses in the underlying asbestos-related lawsuits, and 
issued a memorandum and order to this effect.  The parties 
subsequently stipulated that, under the District Court’s 
interpretation of the exclusion, Travelers must cover 
$21,000,000 of GRC’s losses—the combined limit of the two 
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excess insurance policies.  The District Court accepted this 
stipulation, awarded GRC an additional $15,273,705 in 
prejudgment interest, and entered final judgment for GRC.  
Travelers now appeals the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Asbestos Exclusion. 
II. 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this 
matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Pennsylvania contract 
law governs.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 
78–80 (1938).  In Pennsylvania, “[t]he interpretation of an 
insurance contract is a question of law.”  Donegal Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 2007) (quoting 
Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 893 (Pa. 2006)).  Thus, we 
engage in plenary review of the District Court’s 
determination.  Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 
805 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1986).  In the first instance, the 
insured bears the burden of demonstrating that its claim falls 
within the policy’s affirmative grant of coverage.  Koppers 
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 
1996); Miller v. Boston Ins. Co., 218 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa. 
1966).  Where an insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on the 
basis of a policy exclusion—as Travelers does here—the 
insurer bears the burden of proving the applicability of the 
exclusion as an affirmative defense.  Madison Constr. Co. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999). 
III. 
 We now review the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Asbestos Exclusion.  In doing so, we must “ascertain the 
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intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the 
written instrument.”  Id. (quoting Gene & Harvey Builders v. 
Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n, 517 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 1986)).  Thus, the 
language of the contract must be the “polestar” of our inquiry.  
Id.  When the language is clear and unambiguous, we give 
effect to that language.  Id.  But when the language is 
ambiguous, the provision should “be construed in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer.”  Id.   
A. 
 We begin by deciding whether the language of the 
Asbestos Exclusion is ambiguous.  Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. 
Glob. Reinsurance Corp. of Am., 693 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 
385, 390 (Pa. 1986)).  Ambiguity exists where the language 
of the contract is “reasonably susceptible of different 
constructions and capable of being understood in more than 
one sense.”  Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106 (quoting 
Hutchison, 735 A.2d at 390).  After a bench trial, the District 
Court found the language of the Asbestos Exclusion to 
contain latent ambiguity.  We disagree with the District 
Court’s penultimate conclusion because the Court’s analysis 
overlooked the phrase “arising out of,” which has an 
established, unambiguous meaning under Pennsylvania 
insurance law.   
 The District Court properly began its analysis by 
determining whether the text of the Asbestos Exclusion, 
which precludes indemnification for “EXCESS NET LOSS 
arising out of asbestos,” was ambiguous.  GRC had asserted 
that “asbestos” refers only to mineral asbestos in its raw, 
unprocessed form.  Travelers, on the other hand, maintained 
that “asbestos” is a purposefully broad term which 
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encompasses both asbestos in its raw form and products 
which contain asbestos—such as those manufactured and sold 
by GRC.   
Driven by the parties’ arguments, the District Court 
largely focused on whether the word “asbestos” was 
reasonably susceptible of differing interpretations.  After 
examining various dictionary definitions and grammatical 
uses of “asbestos,” it concluded that the term’s common 
usage “reveal[ed] a latent ambiguity as to what it denotes.”  
Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 658–59.  Without 
deciding which of the parties’ views was more reasonable, the 
District Court found that both were consistent with the plain 
meaning of the language and objectively reasonable.  Because 
“asbestos” was “reasonably capable of being understood in 
more than one sense,” the District Court held that the 
exclusion was ambiguous.  Id. at 660. 
 While the District Court engaged in a thorough 
analysis of the breadth of the term “asbestos,” its focus was 
misplaced.  The rest of the language at issue—“arising out 
of”—has an unambiguous legal meaning that renders any 
uncertainty concerning the meaning of the word “asbestos” 
immaterial.  Pennsylvania courts have long construed the 
phrase “arising out of”—when used in the context of an 
insurance exclusion—to “[m]ean[] causally connected with, 
not proximately caused by.”  McCabe v. Old Republic Ins. 
Co., 228 A.2d 901, 903 (1967); Forum Ins. Co. v. Allied Sec., 
Inc., 866 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1989).  A policy provision 
containing the phrase “arising out of” is satisfied by “‘[b]ut 
for’ causation, i.e., a cause and result relationship.”  Mfrs. 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 170 A.2d 571, 573 
(Pa. 1961).   
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 Recognizing that Pennsylvania courts consistently 
interpret “arising out of” to require “but for” causation, we 
have previously observed that this formulation is “well-
settled,” having been applied in numerous insurance law 
contexts.  Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Squires, 667 F.3d 
388, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2012).  This understanding of the phrase 
is entrenched in Pennsylvania jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Forum 
Ins. Co., 866 F.2d at 82 (holding that “arising out of” requires 
“but for” causation in the context of an exclusion for injury or 
death arising in the course of employment); Smith v. United 
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 572 A.2d 785, 787 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(requiring “but for” causation in interpreting an uninsured 
motorist provision); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Eisenhuth, 451 A.2d 
1024, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (no-fault automobile 
insurance policy); Tuscarora Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Kadlubosky, 889 A.2d 557, 563 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) 
(commercial general liability insurance policy); Roman 
Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 A.2d 665, 
669 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (same).  Not only have courts 
applying Pennsylvania law interpreted “arising out of” to 
require “but for” causation, they have also held that the 
phrase is unambiguous.  See Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d 
at 110 (finding that “arising out of” language was not 
ambiguous); McCabe, 228 A.2d at 903 (same); see also 
Forum Ins. Co., 866 F.2d at 82 (relying on McCabe in 
rejecting an argument that a policy exclusion containing the 
phrase “arising out of . . . his employment” was ambiguous).   
 With this consistent interpretation in mind, we find 
that the plain language of the Asbestos Exclusion, disclaiming 
“EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of asbestos,” is 
unambiguous on its face and is not “reasonably susceptible of 
different constructions.”  Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 
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106.  The provision plainly encompasses losses that would 
not have occurred but for asbestos or which are causally 
connected to asbestos.  Pennsylvania law permits no other 
interpretation. 
B. 
 Although we find the language of the policy to be clear 
on its face, our inquiry does not immediately end when the 
plain meaning of the provision is unambiguous.  Evidence of 
industry custom or trade usage “is always relevant and 
admissible in construing commercial contracts,” and does not 
depend on the existence of ambiguity in the contractual 
language.  Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 
1189, 1193 (Pa. 2001).  Where it can be shown that words 
have a special meaning or usage in a particular industry, 
“members of that industry are presumed to use the words in 
that special way, whatever the words mean in common usage 
and regardless of whether there appears to be any ambiguity 
in the words.”  Id.   
 In the course of arguing that “asbestos” had a separate 
and distinct meaning from “asbestos-containing products,” 
GRC presented industry custom and trade usage evidence 
which was ultimately credited by the District Court as 
supporting GRC’s narrow interpretation of the exclusion.  
Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 654–57.  While 
GRC’s evidence may bear on the ambiguity of the word 
“asbestos,” it does not cloud the meaning of the phrase 
“arising out of.”4  GRC even agrees that “arising out of” 
                                              
4 GRC explains that it “has offered custom and trade 
usage evidence to support its assertion that ‘asbestos’ and 
‘asbestos-containing products’ were distinct terms and that 
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requires “but for” causation.  In its brief, GRC explains that 
its proffered “interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion itself 
utilizes a ‘but for’ causation standard.”  (Appellee Br. at 32.)  
GRC clarifies that its argument has been that the Asbestos 
Exclusion “excludes losses related to (or ‘but for’) the 
mineral asbestos, as opposed to losses related to or ‘but for’ 
GRC’s asbestos-containing products.”  (Appellee Br. at 32.) 
 This argument by GRC incorrectly presumes that the 
meaning attached to “asbestos” would have a material effect 
on the outcome of this coverage dispute.  But assigning “but 
for” causation to the phrase “arising out of” carries the 
important consequence of negating any material ambiguity 
that the term “asbestos” may introduce into the clause.  Even 
the narrowest interpretation of “asbestos”—as referring only 
to raw mineral asbestos—leads to the conclusion that 
coverage for losses associated with the claims against GRC is 
disclaimed by the Asbestos Exclusion.  While we express no 
opinion about whether the term “asbestos” is ambiguous here,  
if we were to credit GRC’s theory that “asbestos” only 
referred to mineral asbestos in its raw, unprocessed form—as 
the District Court did—the asbestos claims against GRC 
would still fall within the Asbestos Exclusion.   
The application of “but for” causation compels the 
conclusion that GRC’s losses are excluded under the policy as 
a matter of law.  “But for” causation “requires the plaintiff to 
show ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence 
of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.”  Univ. of Tex. 
                                                                                                     
‘asbestos’ was not used to unambiguously subsume ‘asbestos-
containing products.’”  (Appellee Br. at 43 n.5, 44–45.)  No 
mention is made of how the evidence bears on the meaning of 
“arising out of.”   
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Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (citing 
Restatement (First) of Torts § 431 cmt. a (1934)); see also 
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 
1990) (noting that “[c]ause in fact or ‘but for’ causation 
requires proof that the harmful result would not have come 
about but for the conduct of the defendant”); First v. Zem 
Zem Temple, 686 A.2d 18, 21 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) 
(quoting E.J. Stewart, Inc. v. Aitken Prods., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 
883, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1985)) (“Cause in fact or ‘but for’ 
causation provides that if the harmful result would not have 
come about but for the negligent conduct then there is a direct 
causal connection between the negligence and the injury.”).  
“But for” causation “is a de minimis standard of causation, 
under which even the most remote and insignificant force 
may be considered the cause of an occurrence.”  Takach v. 
B.M. Root Co., 420 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).   
The claims that underlie this litigation stem from 
exposure to the asbestos incorporated into the finished 
products that GRC manufactured or sold.  GRC “only paid 
settlements and incurred damages when the underlying 
claimants alleged exposure to GRC’s asbestos-containing 
products.”  (Appellee Br. at 37; J.A. 36.)  For each such 
settlement, a claimant was required to produce “sworn 
evidence of exposure to a GRC asbestos-containing product” 
and “medical verification of an asbestos-related disease.”  
(Appellee Br. at 5; J.A. 36.)  GRC’s own expert, Gene Locks, 
testified that asbestos exposure is a necessary precursor to 
asbestos-related disease.  (J.A. 316:18–21.)  Locks further 
agreed that “[w]hatever disease [the asbestos plaintiffs] had 
would have been caused by whatever asbestos fiber they were 
exposed to, whether it came from the raw asbestos . . . or it 
was in the end product.”  (J.A. 302:7–20.)  This is true both of 
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plaintiffs working in a profession that required exposure to 
raw asbestos—such as a miner or miller—and those who 
were exposed to asbestos-containing products.  (Id.)  Locks 
also testified that the fiber released from a product containing 
asbestos is “[t]he same fiber that’s ultimately milled.”  (J.A. 
303:6–9; see also id. at 302:21–303:5; 304:3–5; 304:18–20; 
317:12–22 (stating that asbestos is contained within the end 
product).)    
It is clear that there is an appropriate causal connection 
between asbestos and the losses GRC suffered in asbestos 
litigation, and applying GRC’s narrow interpretation of 
“asbestos” as referring only to raw mineral asbestos does not 
affect the outcome.  Even setting aside Lock’s testimony, 
there is no dispute that some of GRC’s products contain 
asbestos, that the plaintiffs in the underlying asbestos lawsuits 
were exposed to GRC’s asbestos-containing products, and 
that these plaintiffs allege injuries from asbestos-related 
diseases.  These facts alone compel the conclusion that 
asbestos in its raw mineral form is causally connected to the 
losses GRC has incurred as a result of these lawsuits.  But for 
the inclusion of asbestos in GRC’s products—which was 
originally mined or milled as a raw mineral—the plaintiffs 
exposed to those products would not have contracted 
asbestos-related diseases.  In order to find that losses relating 
to exposure to asbestos-containing products are not causally 
connected to raw asbestos, we would need to assign a 
different standard of causation to the phrase “arising out of,” 
which is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the language 




 GRC finally contends that Travelers waived the 
causation argument by not raising it before the District Court.  
Appellate courts will generally refuse to consider issues that 
the parties did not raise below.  Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass 
Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)).  To preserve an 
argument, a party must “unequivocally put its position before 
the trial court at a point and in a manner that permits the court 
to consider its merits.”  Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 
182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999).  But while parties may not 
raise new arguments, they may “place greater emphasis” on 
an argument or “more fully explain an argument on appeal.”   
United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013).   
The parties may even “reframe” their argument “within the 
bounds of reason.”  Id.  
Travelers has argued throughout this litigation that 
GRC’s losses associated with asbestos claims “arise out of 
asbestos” because the claims were caused by exposure to the 
asbestos in GRC’s products.  (See, e.g., Travelers’ Post-Trial 
Br. at 8, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 631; Travelers’ Proposed 
Findings of Fact at 9, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 630; Travelers’ 
Mot. for Summ. J. at 10–11, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 338; 
Travelers’ Reply Br. on Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, E.D. Pa. 
Docket No. 397.)  The causal connection between the claims 
for which GRC seeks indemnification and asbestos in 
whatever form has been an integral part of Travelers’ 
argument as to why the Asbestos Exclusion is applicable.  
While Travelers has focused on this argument with greater 
specificity on appeal, the causation analysis required by the 
Asbestos Exclusion has always been at issue.  GRC is correct 
that Travelers had never before specified that “arising out of” 
is legally synonymous with “but for” causation, but GRC also 
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acknowledged that this theory is the “latest iteration of 
[Travelers’] argument that the claims are excluded by the 
‘plain meaning’ of the Asbestos Exclusion.”  (Appellee Br. at 
20.)  In GRC’s own words, Travelers has consistently 
“maintained that the ‘plain-meaning’ of the exclusion has 
only one reasonable interpretation to exclude claims relating 
to asbestos in any form.”  (Appellee Br. at 22.)  Travelers’ 
plain-meaning theory has always hinged on whether the 
underlying lawsuits were caused by asbestos.   
But even if Travelers’ argument had not been placed 
before the District Court, we would nonetheless consider it in 
reaching our conclusion.  In “exceptional circumstances,” the 
“public interest can require that the issue be heard.”  Walton 
v. Mental Health Ass'n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 
1999).  This is just such an occasion.  The language found 
within this exclusion is prevalent in insurance contracts, and 
our interpretation may affect a wide range of insurers and 
insureds beyond the immediate parties to the suit.  See 
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69–70 (3d Cir. 
1983) (holding that exceptional circumstances were present 
where proper application of Pennsylvania public policies with 
respect to insurance contracts would affect “every inhabitant 
. . . and the insurance companies that serve them”).   
The language in Travelers’ policies is far from unique; 
it is found in numerous Pennsylvania insurance policies that 
have been issued in the fifty years since the decision in 
Goodville established the meaning of “arising out of.”  Were 
we to ignore the consistent and explicit meaning assigned to 
the phrase in Pennsylvania insurance exclusions, we would 
cast doubt on a tradition of interpretation that many parties 
have relied upon in defining their contractual obligations.  
Parties to an insurance contract must be able to place faith in 
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consistent interpretations of common language when drafting 
their policies if they are to properly allocate the risks 
involved.  While future parties may present evidence 
demonstrating a meaning of “arising out of” that is unique to 
their contract, the phrase is not ambiguous on its face when 
used in a Pennsylvania insurance contract. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District 
Court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Travelers. 
 
